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Abstract 
 
We present a detailed, high-frequency data set on the civil 
conflict in Colombia during the period 1988-2002.  We briefly 
introduce the Colombian case and the methodological issues that 
hinder data collection in civil wars, before presenting the pattern 
over time of conflict actions and intensity for all sides involved 
in the confrontation.  We also describe the pattern of 
victimisation by group and the victimisation of civilians out of 
clashes.   
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1 Introduction 
Civil conflicts are a major obstacle to economic and human development.  Yet, the field of 
development economics has tended to neglect conflict, focusing mainly on the development 
problem under calm conditions. In fact, in our literature search we found thirteen development 
economics textbooks, none of which mentions the subject of conflict. 
 There is, however, an existing empirical literature that World Bank (2003) draws on 
and extends, presenting many useful ideas on the causes of and possible cures for civil 
conflicts.  The strongest theme running through this work is to emphasise the financial basis 
of civil conflicts more and their ideological and ethnic underpinnings less than has typically 
been the case in previous work.  The standard approach in this literature is to work with a 
large data set of many countries and to run cross-country regressions.  A rare exception is 
Deininger (2003) who analysed a household survey in Uganda that had civil war related 
questions on it, allowing him to study issues such as the pattern of victimisation and the 
determinants of participation in the war. 
 There is also now a rapidly growing theoretical literature on the economics of conflict 
that is surveyed in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (1996), Sandler (2000) and Breton et. al (2002).  
This literature tends to see civil conflicts as a struggle over resources, consistent with the 
above empirical work.  However, the development of these models has been hampered by the 
absence of solid micro-empirics on actual conflicts.  An important exception is the literature 
on terrorism where there are good data and a healthy interplay between theoretical and 
empirical work (e.g., Enders and Sandler, 2000), but this work is only partially related to civil 
conflicts. 
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 Finally, there are many case studies of civil conflict, typically written by military 
analysts or political scientists.1  These can be very valuable but, of course, there is much to be 
added by empirical work on particular conflicts based on solid data sets.  Unfortunately, such 
data are rare, rendering many of the assertions in the case studies difficult to prove.2
 We present here for the first time a time series data set for a civil war that is detailed, 
high-frequency and long.  This allows us to study the actions of all participants in the 
Colombian civil conflict over a long time period.  In fact, our main contribution here is simply 
to introduce the data set that we have collected over the last two years.  Beyond that, we 
present its basic contours including the pattern over time of fundamentals such as the number 
of attacks, clashes, and casualties arranged by group and the victimisation profile.  We hope 
this contribution will stimulate further empirical and theoretical work on the Colombian 
conflict as well as the subject of civil conflict in general.  In particular, we expect that the 
methodology and learning process of setting up this data set will enable us to start collecting 
micro data from other internal conflicts around the world, allowing us to further test some of 
the hypotheses offered here. 
 
2 The Colombian civil conflict  
The Colombian conflict is a contest for political power of long duration and low intensity.  In 
these respects it is a characteristic civil war and is, therefore, an interesting object of study 
since its lessons can potentially apply to other civil conflicts. 
 At the same time, the Colombian conflict has particular features that further enhance 
its interest as a case study.  There are no ethnic, regional or religious cleavages defining the 
                                                 
1 For the case of Colombia see, e.g., Marks (2002). 
2 The only other civil conflict data set we have seen is the Index of Deaths for the Northern Ireland conflict 
compiled by Malcolm Sutton (1994), listing deaths as a consequence of conflict activities in Northern Ireland. 
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conflict, allowing us to focus purely on its economic, political and military features.3  A 
second special feature relates to political institutions.  Colombia’s democracy is one of the 
most stable in the Americas, with only one non-democratically elected government in the last 
century (during 1953-57), no major periods of government organised political repression, 
continuous political reform and a sound tradition of civil liberties and freedom of speech.  
Nonetheless, Colombia has been subject to atrocious periods of political violence both 
between the two main parties that have historically dominated the political landscape 
(Liberals and Conservatives) and, more recently, against political minorities, leading to their 
political exclusion.4  The conflict itself has arguably increased political exclusion as armed 
groups tend to restrict political activities where they dominate de facto.  This political 
ambivalence repeats itself in the economic realm.  Colombia has had a positive economic 
performance, exhibiting an average per capita growth rate of 2% since 1950 and only one 
recession since 1928.  On the other hand, widespread poverty persists, with more than 50% of 
the population subsisting on less than two dollars a day, and the country has one of the most 
unequal distributions of income in South America (ECLAC, 2003).   
A standard, although arbitrary, definition of civil war is that more than 1,000 people 
per year are killed in combat (Singer and Small, 1982).  By this measure Colombia has long 
had sufficient violence for its conflict to qualify as a civil war.  Still, some (e.g., Posada, 
2001) have argued that the Colombian conflict today is not in a strict sense a civil war, as the 
                                                 
3 Over 90% of Colombians are Roman Catholics and there is no militant minority in either religious or racial 
terms.  Most of the population is of mixed racial origin with no minority making up more than 2% of the 
population.  The political system has increased the inclusiveness of minorities, reserving two Senate seats for 
indigenous people (Political Constitution, art. 171) and two Chamber seats for communities of blacks.  There are 
also extensive programs for securing property titles for indigenous and black communities.  Even though these 
ethnically defined groups continue to lag behind the rest of the population in most development indicators, they 
are not overrepresented in armed groups. 
4 During the La Violencia period that we will refer to below, the confrontation was between the two traditional 
parties.  In recent history, the most significant episode of political violence was the systematic assassination of 
members of Unión Patriótica, a leftist party connected to the FARC (the main guerrilla group), created during 
peace negotiations in the early eighties.  It is estimated that more than 800 of its members, including two 
presidential candidates, were assassinated.  During the eighties and nineties other demobilised guerrilla groups 
were also subject to violence.  Labour unions have as well suffered continuously from political violence.   
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country is not split along supporters of the main warring factions.  Indeed the vast majority of 
the population supports Colombian institutions generally and the armed forces and the police 
in particular, and show almost complete opposition to the guerrillas and the paramilitaries 
(Gallup Poll, 2003).  Many would argue as well that the conflict is fought against an extremist 
minority fuelled by narcotics money, kidnapping, extortion and expropriation that particularly 
victimises civilians, mainly in isolated and poor areas of the countryside and is, therefore, not 
a civil war. 
Other authors see the current civil strife as emanating from a single continuous 
conflict since the independence of the country from Spain (Fischer, 2000, Eisenstadt and 
García, 1995) and several commentators see it as one of the world's longest running civil 
conflicts, starting in 1946 during the so-called period of  La Violencia (see references 
provided by Posada, 2001).  However, there have been various periods in the conflict, 
including some long ones of relative peace. 
Apart from the La Violencia period (1946-66) in which the country was split along the 
lines of the Liberal and Conservative parties, fighting has been mostly between several 
guerrilla groups and government forces with the more recent participation of paramilitary 
forces also fighting against the guerrillas.  The origin of the guerrilla groups can be traced 
back to leftist peasant self-defence organisations aligned with the Liberal party, even before 
La Violencia.  The Liberals and Conservatives started to negotiate an end to La Violencia 
beginning with the formation of a government of “consensual” dictatorship (1953-57) during 
which most guerrilla groups were dismantled.  This led to a substantial reduction in conflict 
activities, although the pacification process continued into the 1960s.  Military rule ended 
with an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties to alternate in power, the so-
called Frente Nacional, which lasted until 1974.  This pact required that only one of the two 
leading parties would run candidates in the presidential elections and that they would share 
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equally in government positions.  Of course, this arrangement restricted democracy and 
increased political exclusion.  On the other hand, elections were conducted regularly and 
contested by outside candidates.5  
During the Frente Nacional and until 1989, the Colombian conflict was essentially a 
Cold War proxy fight, with some partisan guerrillas transforming themselves into established 
guerrilla groups, most of them associated with various communist factions.  Soviet bloc 
countries supported guerrilla groups with arms, ammunition, military training and sometimes 
money.  On the government side, the US influenced the conflict through the development and 
dissemination of its “National Security Doctrine” of counterinsurgency, mostly via the 
Escuela de las Americas. 
There are two significant guerrilla groups currently active in Colombia.  The Armed 
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC, in its Spanish acronym) was founded in 1964 after 
the government ordered an attack on one of the partisan self-defence agrarian movements that 
had originated in La Violencia.  Today the FARC is estimated to have between 16,000 and 
20,000 combatants, making it the largest guerrilla group in the world.  The second largest 
guerrilla group in Colombia is the National Liberation Army (ELN), which was founded in 
1965 with support from the Cuban government.  The ELN faced a profound crisis during the 
eighties but was reborn, thanks mainly to extortion targeted at multinational companies 
trading in natural resources.  The ELN is thought to have from 4,000 to 6,000 combatants.  
These guerrilla groups are largely rural and follow typical guerrilla tactics in a protracted 
conflict, attacking mainly fixed government positions and public infrastructure.  On several 
occasions the FARC and ELN entered into peace talks with the government, most recently 
                                                 
5 Some of the elections were remarkably competitive.  For example, in 1970 the former military dictator Gustavo 
Rojas ran for president outside the framework of the Frente Nacional and lost to the Conservative candidate 
Misael Pastrana by only a few thousand votes.  However, some of Rojas’ followers did not accept the result and 
created the M-19 guerrilla movement, which argued that the political system was exclusive, undemocratic and 
elite-dominated, and needed to be fought with armed struggle. 
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during a three and a half year period under the Andrés Pastrana government (1998-2002) 
leading to the demilitarisation of a large zone in the south of the country known as the zone of 
Despeje. 
The paramilitary groups are for the most part gathered under the umbrella alliance 
United Self-Defence groups of Colombia (AUC), which was formally created in 1997, 
although paramilitary groups and self-defence organisations can be traced back to the end of 
the seventies (Pizarro, 2003).  In the late eighties and the beginning of the nineties these 
groups acquired notoriety due to strong links with the narcotraffic cartels.  1994 marked a 
turning point for the paramilitaries because that was when they first began localised 
operations against guerrilla groups (more on this below).  Within a few years the 
paramilitaries became a major factor in the conflict.  In 2003 the AUC started demobilisation 
talks with the government, leading to an initial decommissioning act at the end of that year. 
Government forces include the military (army, navy, and air force), the National 
Police and other small security corps like the security service (DAS).  The National Police is 
in charge of internal security and normal policing duties. The former function corresponds to 
what is known in military and security terms as “paramilitary” operations in which forces, 
usually armed with automatic weapons, conduct internal security operations, without large 
numbers of operatives and without the use of artillery, restricting themselves to urban areas.  
These actors must be distinguished from what we call “paramilitary” groups in our data set as 
the latter neither belong to the institutional apparatus nor are under command and control of 
the state. 
There is much speculation on the quantity and sources of funding for the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries.  Kidnapping, extortion and the appropriation of rents derived from narcotics 
crops play a large role with the approximate shares being uncertain.  Looting of local budgets 
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seems to be another source of guerrilla funding that is important in townships that are able to 
tax local natural resource rents. 
The conflict has ebbed and flowed over the years.  The guerrillas made very little 
military progress from 1962-1980 (Pizarro, 1996).  Indeed, guerrilla activity in those years 
was so low that during the sixties Colombia's homicide rate conformed to the Latin-American 
average.6  By the data set-inclusion standard of Singer and Small (1982) and Marshall and 
Gurr, (2003) of more than a thousand battle-related deaths per annum, the Colombian conflict 
might have disappeared during those years. 
Just before the end of the Cold War the conflict intensified, coinciding with several 
political and economic events.  First, there was the emergence of strong narcotraffic cartels 
and the criminality associated with them.  Second, the peace process of the Belisario Betancur 
government (1982-86) failed.  Third, the FARC formed a political wing, the Unión Patriótica, 
but virtually all its members were systematically exterminated.  Fourth, associated with 
narcotraffic, paramilitary groups became stronger.  Finally, the guerrillas suffered a drastic 
reduction of support from the Soviet bloc.  The escalation of guerrilla activity despite a 
decrease in outside patronage was probably enabled by stocks of weapons unused during the 
long truces of the Betancur government as well as new money accumulated from a sharp 
increase in kidnapping and extortion targeted on multinational enterprises during this period. 
Our raw data source allows us to pick up the story in 1988; two years after the 
reintensification of the conflict began.  Several successful peace processes led a number of 
guerrilla groups to abandon armed fighting and create political movements.7  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
6 The WHO estimates that for the year 2000 the murders per 100,000 inhabitants in countries of low and middle 
income of the Americas was 27.5, which is similar to the observed rate from 1963 to 1980 in Colombia, whereas 
Colombia’s murder rate in recent years has been between 60 and 80 per 100,000 inhabitants.   Some of the latest 
murder rates available for Latin American countries (WHO, 2002) are (year in parenthesis): Brazil, 27.7 (1995), 
Chile 9.0 (1994), Mexico 19.8 (1997) and 23.2 for Venezuela (1994). 
7 The successful processes involved the M-19 (1990), and a series of smaller groups called Quintín Lame (1991), 
EPL (1991), CRS-ELN (1994) and the PRT (1991). 
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the intensity of the conflict remained roughly constant until 1994 when it began to accelerate 
continuously up through to the present.  Although there is significant continuity of actors in 
the conflict going back to the 1950s, in terms of both intensity and qualitative characteristics 
the last 15 years can be considered as a valid unit of analysis.  Our dataset includes the hottest 
period of war while allowing a significant degree of historical perspective. 
 
3 The data set 
There are few detailed databases of internal conflicts available.  Data gathering during 
a civil strife is highly complicated and even life-threatening.  Armed groups issue threats and 
generate fear, severely hampering the flow of information and many military and guerrilla 
actions are clandestine or illegal.  Civil wars also take place disproportionately in poor 
countries and, in many cases, institutional deficiencies tied to underdevelopment and poverty 
hamper data gathering.  In addition, data collection tends not to be a priority when a regime is 
under siege.  Even in rich countries that experience civil conflicts, e.g., Ireland and Spain, few 
data are available. 
Even when data sets on civil conflict exist they have serious failures.  They tend to 
have low frequency, a short time span and the criteria for data inclusion are usually poor.  The 
main problem is that the data sets are not designed to measure both specific actions and the 
intensity of a conflict, causing a lack of information on the real impact of particular events.8  
There could also be inclusion bias since the organisations gathering the data can be blamed 
for events depending on whether or not these events are included in the data or, given 
inclusion, blame may depend on classification.  For example, a government army has strong 
                                                 
8 When we refer to the intensity of a conflict, we refer to an objective measure of the impact that each conflict 
event has.  This distinction was introduced by Singer and Small (1982) in their seminal work on conflict data and 
wars.  Usually intensity is measured by the number of casualties (killed and injured individuals) or by the size of 
the geographical area affected by hostilities. 
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incentives to classify as many as possible out of the people it kills as enemy combatants rather 
than civilians.  Another inclusion problem derives from the way in which conflict data are 
often a sub sample of other data sets, for example health and criminal justice data, that were 
designed for different purposes.  Thus, the paucity of case studies of civil wars and civil 
conflicts that are grounded in proper data is hardly surprising. 
In the case of Colombia, existing data sets have the above and other problems.  For 
example, the criminality DIJIN-Data set from the National Police includes information on 
guerrilla attacks.  This data set has daily information, though only from 1993 when the 
conflict was well under way.  More importantly, the data list events but without any intensity 
measure such as the number of people killed, as we have in our data set.  The main basis for 
data inclusion is reports to police authorities or events known to police authorities in 
townships, excluding events that are not reported, particularly those that occur outside of 
institutional presence.  Clashes between military forces, guerrillas and paramilitaries are not 
usually registered in this database because they do not involve the police.  All police 
operations are registered but not all attacks by the guerrillas or paramilitaries are.  Criminality 
data sets are available annually since 1960, but the formal classification is either that of health 
statistics or is criminological typology, making it difficult to isolate the effect of the armed 
conflict from various forms of organised crime, common crime and other types of violence.  
There are other data sets at the Colombian internal security agency (DAS) and at the Ministry 
of Defence, devised mainly for strategic purposes, but typically researchers are only allowed 
access to highly aggregated low-frequency subsets of them.  Some NGO’s such as País Libre 
and Codhes produce data sets, but they are limited to specialised aspects of the conflict 
(kidnapping and internal displacement, respectively).   
We created our database using events listed in the periodicals Justicia y Paz and 
Noche y Niebla published quarterly by the Colombian NGO'S CINEP and the Comisión 
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Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz.  These organisations joined forces in 1987 to provide 
detailed documentation of “political violence” in Colombia and to measure the impact of the 
conflict on the population.  Justicia y Paz first appeared in the second quarter of 1988.  In 
1996 its data collection methodology was revised leading to a new conceptual and theoretical 
framework in which internationally accepted legal definitions of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were added to the previous sociological categories as 
criteria for the data classification process.  At that time Justicia y Paz was replaced by the 
new periodical Noche y Niebla.9  
The publications present a detailed description of chronologically ordered violent 
events in Colombia.  This description includes date of occurrence, geographical location (at 
the township or municipality level) and the group, or groups, deemed responsible for causing 
an event or intervening in the event if they do not cause it.  There is also a description of the 
results of the action on individuals killed and injured and the group to which the victims are 
thought to belong which is either an armed group or civilians.  Some events include other 
effects on individuals such as threats, kidnappings and detentions (legal or arbitrary).  There 
are two primary sources for data gathering.  The first is press articles from more than 20 daily 
newspapers of both national and regional coverage.  The second is reports gathered directly 
by members of human rights NGO’s and other organisations on the ground such as local 
public ombudsmen and, particularly, the clergy.  Since the Catholic Church maintains 
coverage even in the most remote areas of the country we can be very confident of the 
coverage and accuracy of these data, although, of course, there is no way to guarantee that 
they have captured every single event.  The data are intended to include all acts of “political 
violence”, defined as those violent acts “… exerted as a means of political-social fighting 
aimed at maintaining, modifying, substituting or destroying a model of state or society or 
                                                 
9 Recent issues of the periodical are available to the public at www.nocheyniebla.org. 
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directed to the destruction or repression of a human group, organised or not, identified by 
social, political, occupation, ethnic, racial, religious, cultural or ideological traits.” (Noche y 
Niebla, 2003, our translation).   
A large share of events included in the publications follows the methodological 
criterion of motivation behind a violent act.  Another key criterion is that violent interactions 
be definable in terms of groups causing them.10  This turns out to be consistent with the view 
of social conflict, as distinct from organised crime, espoused recently in the economic 
literature as conflict between organised socially defined groups (Esteban and Ray, 1999).  
Therefore, strictly adopting these two criteria allows us to exclude from our sub sample 
violent events that are purely criminal in nature.  It is this feature of our data set that makes it 
so valuable for civil war research.  Of course, the boundary between political violence and 
criminal violence is often blurred and the two types of activity interact with each other.11  
Nevertheless, both the methodological definition and a detailed investigation of cases in the 
data set reveal that the research conforms well to intuitive concepts of political violence. 
CINEP itself has produced interesting work with the use of these records.12  Their 
main goal is to quantify the number and nature of human rights violations and violations to 
IHL.  They also measure, although differently from us, the number of bellicose actions but 
with a shorter time horizon than in the present paper.  As bellicose actions can violate both 
IHL and human rights, there are large intersections between categories leading to 
                                                 
10The World Health Organisation refers to “collective violence” as the instrumental use of violence by people 
who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent 
identity – against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives. 
11 In recent reports on civil wars both Marshall and Gurr (2003) and the World Bank (2003) stress the 
significance of organised criminal activities in financing violent conflicts in, amongst others, Afghanistan, 
Algeria, the Balkans, Colombia, Peru and Turkey.  Gaitán (2001) discusses in detail the problems associated 
with the use of criminality data sets in an environment of changing legal statutes and a weak judiciary such as 
Colombia.  See also Díaz et. al. (2003) that argues that for Colombia the conflict drives criminal activity. 
12 González et al (2003) presents a reading of the data that concentrates on the Human Rights dimension of the 
conflict. 
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overestimation of the impact of events in the raw data.  However, we eliminate this problem 
in our data set. 
In building our database, we included only those actions that, given the description 
found in the publication, we considered as bellicose by following the criteria of motivation 
and group action.13  In this way, we concentrate on the “classical” side of the war; i.e., those 
violent episodes that are part of the Colombian internal conflict and not cases of ordinary 
crime, while solving the problem of over counting arising from having overlapping criteria for 
inclusion.14  We also believe that this classification procedure is more objective than the 
criteria of the other categories included in the original publications, as it is based on  a clear 
characterisation of “warfare actions” as defined by the Geneva Convention as bellicose 
actions.15  It follows that there is a wide range of events including not only clashes but also 
incursions, shootings, attacks on military targets, ambushes, attacks on pipelines and energy 
and communication infrastructure, etc.   
Our database records a set of characteristics for each event, including intensity as 
measured by the number of individuals killed, injured, detained and retained.16  For each 
event we include general descriptors: date and location (township and department); whether 
or not there was a clash and, if so, the groups involved; whether or not there was an attack 
                                                 
13 This means that we included most, but not all, of the events that are classified in Noche y Niebla as bellicose 
actions and occasionally there are others that we consider bellicose according to our criteria that are not 
classified in this way by Noche y Niebla. 
14 In any case, we expect the “non-classical” side of the conflict, i.e., that involving threats and terror, to be 
strongly correlated with the variables we measure here.  Bellicose actions are precisely those conflict events that 
can be measured most accurately with very low underreporting. 
15 Specifically this means “all the actions that have to do with legitimate matters of war in the sense that they 
have a well defined military aim”.  Some of these actions are legitimate in the sense of the Geneva Convention, 
but not all of them are.  We do not pursue here this distinction. 
16 The difference between detained and retained rests on the fact that detained individuals are in the hands of 
government officials, either with fulfilment of all legal requirements or not, and retentions are done by non-state 
armed actors.  The last category includes kidnappings only when they are massive or result from warfare actions.  
We do not register kidnappings of individuals as such not only because it is an activity high on the list of actions 
for both armed groups and organised crime in Colombia but also because there is substantial underreporting of 
kidnappings.  Note that for the rest of the paper we work only with killings and injuries as intensity measures. 
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and, if so, the type of attack and the group(s) responsible; finally killings and injuries, the 
intensity measures.   
When as part of a single action various bellicose events take place, we include these 
events in multiple ways.  If, for example, during a guerrilla incursion to a township there is a 
shooting and an assault on a police station, we code both events with the corresponding 
description and intensity.  We have two major descriptive categories for each event - clash or 
attack - and, as one might expect, these categories are closely related.  We define a clash as a 
direct encounter between two or more groups of armed individuals that results in armed 
combat.  We define an attack as a violent event in which there is no direct, armed combat 
between two groups.  Still, on many occasions a clash is preceded or followed by an attack.  
This distinction is vital for internal conflicts due to the preponderance of non-clash situations 
over clashes.  We can observe a clash without an attack, for example a direct confrontation 
between paramilitary forces and a guerrilla group without a previous attack on a guerrilla 
camp; an attack without a clash, for example the destruction of a bridge; and we can register 
an attack followed by a clash, e.g., if a shooting in a town precipitates a military reaction 
leading to a clash.  In these cases we would have coded the events respectively as a clash, an 
attack and a clash with an attack. 
We followed a stringent quality control regime in cleaning the data that proceeded in 
four stages, covering both event inclusion and the coding of events.  First, we randomly 
sampled a large number of events and checked against the CINEP source that they were 
properly included and coded.  Second, we did another big random sample of events, looked 
up these events in press archives and again verified our inclusion and coding.  This was a test 
both of the transfer of information from the CINEP source to our database and of the quality 
of the CINEP information itself, which turned out to be extremely high.  Third, we found all 
the big events in the dataset and carefully investigated each one in the press record.  Finally, 
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we compared lists of significant events from other sources with our data, such as Human 
Rights Watch and Colombian government reports. 
Finally, it is important to mention a couple of methodological definitions used by 
CINEP and Justicia y Paz in their coding.  Responsibility is attributed to the active group 
executing an action, even if other armed groups suffer casualties.  Also, on many occasions 
there are different types of actions associated with one event (e.g., ambush and attack on the 
military, minefield and ambush, etc.).  In these cases the type of event presented is the one 
that offers the “greatest descriptive richness” (CINEP, 2002).   
Our database has several desirable characteristics.  We have daily data.  Since groups 
not directly involved in the conflict collect the data, the above-mentioned biases are kept to a 
minimum.  We account for all armed group actions.  Data gathering is designed from the 
beginning to measure the impact of the conflict, i.e., the data set is not derived from data 
collected for other purposes such as measuring health or criminality.  Of course, it is not a 
complete set of all conflict-related actions by all participating groups.  An internal conflict is 
fought by multiple means, violent and non-violent, and much important activity is difficult to 
measure, such as the results of a particular propaganda campaign.  Even violent actions are 
often clandestine and many actions, such as threats or kidnappings, are poorly reported.  
Other methods besides force and the threat of force play a large role in the dynamics of a 
conflict.  Yet our data allow us to perform a real in-depth analysis of the pure conflict 
activities of armed parties in an internal conflict.  As such, it represents a substantial 
improvement over the previously available data, not only for the Colombian case, but also for 
civil conflict in general. 
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4 Looking at the Data 
4.1 The dynamics of the conflict 
We begin with basic activity and intensity levels.  Figure 1 shows the time series of the 
number of clashes and attacks, a measure of intensity (killings plus injuries) and the homicide 
rate all per 100,000 inhabitants.17  The number of clashes and attacks has increased 
continuously since 1998, reversing a slow decline starting in 1992.  The intensity measure 
reverses itself earlier (in 1995) and rises much faster than the other series.  Clearly the conflict 
has become more active and deadly. It is clear that the intensity and events measures are quite 
poorly tied to the homicide rate.  Therefore, studies of the conflict that rely on the homicide 
rate as intensity measures are likely to be rather misleading.  As a result, we can already see 
good potential for new insights into the conflict based on our data. 
<Insert figure 1 approximately here> 
Guerrilla wars are frequently referred to as “low intensity conflicts” and the 
designation fits the Colombian case well.  During the 15 years of our data set, we can attribute 
47,420 casualties directly to the conflict.  This is an average of 3,161 casualties per year, 
including about 2,127 killings.  Some figures are useful for comparative purposes.  The 
number of American personnel killed during World War II was 291,557 while 33,651 were 
killed in the Korean War and 47,378 in Vietnam (US Department of Defence Records, 2001).  
The conflict in Sri Lanka has produced around 2,000 conflict-related deaths per year over the 
last 19 years while that in Nepal had around 1,000 deaths per year since 1997.  The total 
number of homicides in Colombia, which must include most if not all of our registered 
killings, reached a peak of 28,837 in 2002 after falling in 1998 to 23,095 from its previous 
peak of 28,280 in 1991.   
                                                 
17 Recall that a clash is a direct confrontation between two armed groups with fire exchanged while attacks are 
unopposed events. 
 15
The average ratio of killed to injured individuals over the period, a measure of the 
degree of lethality of conflict events, was 2.05.  This ratio declined almost continuously until 
1999 when it jumped to 2.55, eventually reverting to its long-run average in 2002.  The 
average number of casualties per action over the entire period is only 2.5.  There were about 
108 actions per month for a total of 19,380 actions. 
Guerrilla wars typically do not have large battles.  Nevertheless, the increase in the 
lethality of conflict activities in Colombia can be explained by an important change in the 
pattern of activities in the conflict beginning in 1998 when attacks began to clearly surpass 
clashes as the main type of event in the conflict (figure 1), despite both growing rapidly. An 
associated phenomenon is the faster increase of killings relative to injuries during this period 
shown in figure 2.  Attacks are primarily perpetrated by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries, 
accounting for much of the killing in the data. 
<Insert figure 2 approximately here> 
The conflict literature stresses another key characteristic of internal conflicts: the 
asymmetry of fighting technologies across contestants.  Guerrilla forces concentrate on 
attacks and avoid clashes while the military and other government forces fight almost 
exclusively in clashes (figures 3 and 4).18   This pattern of activity allows the guerrilla groups 
to create advantages for themselves and to economise in the development of operations 
against their opponents.  In this respect the paramilitaries resemble the guerrillas.  Note also 
the sharp increase in attacks by both of these illegal armed groups beginning in 1996 (figure 
3). 
<Insert figure 3 approximately here> 
                                                 
18 Many of the attacks (around 60%) involving the government were aerial bombardments or hostage rescue 
operations.  The former has recently been the government's main source of strategic superiority against the 
guerrillas. 
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In figure 4 note the wedge in the number of clashes between the guerrillas and the 
government that appeared around 1997 and is filled by the paramilitaries.  This phenomenon 
is part of what we call the “paramilitarisation” of the conflict (Chernick, 1998 and 2001), 
described later in section 4.3, a feature of various internal conflicts.19  The paramilitary forces 
also seem to follow the old Marxist dictum of combining all forms of struggle, performing a 
significant number of attacks.  This has imposed some costs on the guerrillas who have taken 
part in more than 4,125 clashes since 1995 while the government forces have only had to 
participate in 3,798 fighting events. 
<Insert figure 4 approximately here> 
 We distinguish between three main stages of the conflict (figure 1).  These stages are 
most apparent in the intensity series but present in the attacks and clashes series as well.  We 
call 1988-1991 the “adjustment period”, in which the guerrillas and the government were 
responding both to tightening financial constraints due to the end of the Cold War and to the 
failure of peace processes.  During this period there was a slow increase in both actions and 
intensity, with a marked peak in 1991 corresponding to the introduction of a new political 
constitution.  The FARC did not participate in the relevant negotiations, elections or the 
constitutional assembly and initiated violence as part of its rejectionism.  This period also 
contained the first noticeable activity for the paramilitaries (figure 7), probably associated 
with the narcotic mafias rather than anti-insurgent operations.  During the second period of 
1992-1995, what we call the “stagnation period”, both the intensity of the conflict and the 
frequency of attacks and clashes decreased almost continuously (figure 1).  Finally, from 
1996 to the present, the “upsurge period”, there were strong increases in intensity and in 
activities, the latter driven by an increase in attacks and clashes.   
                                                 
19 Just to name a few, the conflicts of Aceh-Indonesia, West Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Guatemala, and Mexico 
(Chiapas) have all spawned strong paramilitary groups.   
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 4.2 Victimisation 
Here we present the pattern of victimisation by group resulting from bellicose events.  
We add up the number of casualties of every group, including civilians, for those actions in 
which a particular group took part actively.20  This means that for figures 5 through 7 some 
information in each figure will reappear in the other two as, for example, a FARC guerrilla 
casualty in a clash with the National Police will appear as a guerrilla casualty in those clashes 
in which the guerrillas took part and as a guerrilla casualty in those clashes in which the 
government forces took part.  Still, each of the three figures accurately represents what we 
intend it to do. 
 We start with victimisation in bellicose events in which guerrillas were actively 
involved.  Note that the guerrillas are unique in that they are the only group that inflicts 
significant casualties on all the other armed groups as well as on civilians.  Figure 5 shows the 
number of people of various types killed or injured in events in which the guerrillas were 
active participants.  We observe two clear periods.  During the “adjustment” and “stagnation” 
periods, the guerrillas concentrated on fighting government forces causing a relatively low 
and stable level of civilian casualties.  During the “upsurge” period the guerrillas began to kill 
or injure a large and increasing number of civilians.  Guerrilla casualties to paramilitaries also 
increased sharply while their victimisation of government forces increased only a little on 
average, though with large fluctuations.  Interestingly, the numbers of casualties of the 
government and of the guerrillas parallel each other rather well except for 1996-99, despite 
the fact that they have completely different fighting technologies.  Guerrilla gains against the 
government starting in 1996 are reversed beginning in 1999.  The high level of government 
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casualties of 1997-1998 reflects several well-planned attacks against isolated military 
outposts.  However, from 1998 the government substantially improved its use of air firepower 
and became better able to defend itself.  Paramilitary casualties hardly existed until just before 
the “upsurge” period, confirming the view that before this period they were more involved in 
drug trafficking than in anti-insurgent warfare.  From 1997 onwards the paramilitaries 
consolidated as a national organisation (the AUC), enabling them to organise large offensives 
against guerrilla forces, leading to a big increase in anti-guerrilla operations.  The rise of 
paramilitary casualties during the “upsurge” paralleled the trend of civilian casualties suffered 
in guerrilla-involved events while the guerrillas themselves where also suffering increasing 
losses.  The rise in civilian casualties was probably connected to the fierce rivalry between the 
paramilitaries and guerrillas, with both groups targeting civilian “infrastructure” thought to be 
supporting the other group (Spencer, 2001).  Thus, in their own defence both groups would 
claim that people classified as dead civilians in our data set were, at least in part, military 
assets of the other side. 
<Insert figure 5 approximately here> 
Figure 6 shows the victimisation classification for bellicose events in which 
government forces were actively involved.21  Note that government casualties appear much 
lower in this picture than they did in the previous one, reflecting the relative importance of 
attacks over clashes for the guerrillas.  When the government is an active force it has the lead, 
and in most cases these events are clashes, inflicting larger losses on the guerrillas than the 
guerrillas inflict on the government forces.  This fact contrasts with the relatively similar 
number of losses of guerrilla forces and government forces in guerrilla operations that we 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 We will use various phrases about belligerent groups such as that they “were actively involved”, “participated 
in” or “took part in” an event synonymously.  None of these phrases is meant to imply that that party initiated or 
caused an event although this might have been the case. 
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noted above, suggesting that the government should maintain an offensive posture to the 
extent possible.  We also observe again the effect of guerrilla operations against isolated 
military and police bases during 1997-98.  Government involvement in civilian casualties in 
our data set occurs mostly for aerial bombardments of guerrilla columns, kidnapping rescue 
operations and judicially sanctioned search operations.  The nature of these operations 
indicates that the government probably did not initiate them with intent to harm civilians.  A 
further indication that these casualties could be described as "collateral damage" is the fact 
that approximately 65% of them are injuries rather than killings.  The figure indicates that 
civilian casualties peak in 1999 with continuous improvement thereafter.  Figure 8 displays an 
improvement in government human rights performance and we will return to this issue.  
Finally, it is important to observe that the paramilitaries barely register as a target of 
government forces, at least until the very end of the sample period.22
<Insert figure 6 approximately here> 
Figure 7 shows the victimisation classification for events in which paramilitary forces 
were actively involved.  Large-scale paramilitary activity is a relatively new phenomenon in 
the conflict, although the paramilitaries did kill significant numbers of civilians before the 
“upsurge” period of the conflict.  After a few years of decline paramilitary activity began to 
increase in 1994-95, coinciding with a short-lived government policy that encouraged the 
creation of local “self-defence” groups.  By 1998 the paramilitary threat to civilians became 
dire, shortly after the already mentioned consolidation around that year, which was announced 
publicly in December 1997.  At about the same time suddenly there were many paramilitary 
casualties.  It was not until 1999 that the paramilitaries began to kill many guerrillas.  In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 The reader might expect that figures 5 and 6 would be identical.  But recall that this is essentially a three-sided 
conflict.  In particular, figure 5 includes events between paramilitaries and guerrillas with no government active 
involvement that are not included in figure 6. 
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guerrilla casualties have almost always been lower than the paramilitaries’ own casualties.  
This suggests that the paramilitaries are rather ineffective in clashes. 
<Insert figure 7 approximately here> 
As mentioned above the AUC views its killings of civilians as “anti-infrastructure” 
activity (Aranguren, 2001).  Patterns in our data support this characterisation.  First, the ratio 
of civilians killed to injured in operations involving paramilitaries is at least quadruple the 
corresponding ratio for government operations, pointing to the intentional killing of unarmed 
individuals.  Another indication we glean from inspection of the database is that most 
paramilitary killings of civilians were in zones actively contested with guerrilla forces, often 
in “selective” massacres in which the paramilitaries enter a village with a list of alleged 
guerrilla supporters and attempt to kill everyone on the list.23  They have concentrated on this 
strategy despite the distractions of clashes with the guerrillas and suffering several major 
setbacks at the end of the period (e.g., footnote 22). 
 
4.3 Victimisation of civilians  
The number of civilians killed or injured out of clashes by the different armed groups is a 
good proxy for the level of atrocities committed during the course of the war, as these are 
identified as non-combatant individuals that have “protected” status under IHL.  Moreover, 
when there is no clash there can only be one armed group involved in an incident so it is easy 
to attribute blame.  In a clash attribution can be very difficult.  For example, in cases where 
guerrillas enter a village and kill civilians drawing a government response and a clash, these 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 It seems that typically when there is an encounter of paramilitary and government forces the former rapidly 
surrender to avoid fighting, leading to the detention of many paramilitaries in Colombian jails.  The peak of 
government involvement in paramilitary casualties was in 2002 due to a particular aerial bombardment against a 
paramilitary position being attacked by guerrillas.  This was a major setback for the AUC. 
23 A massacre is defined as the simultaneous killing of four or more individuals unable to defend themselves. 
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killings will nevertheless turn up in figure 6 as government-related.  Thus, out-of-clash 
casualties are a useful measure of human rights violations. 
 As figure 8 shows, the number of civilians killed has increased dramatically during the 
whole of the “upsurge” period.  For both paramilitary and guerrilla belligerents the increase 
was very sharp.  During the “adjustment” and “stagnation” periods the paramilitaries closely 
followed by the guerrillas inflicted the most civilian victimisation.  During the “upsurge” the 
paramilitaries inflicted the majority of civilian casualties out of clash, except for the last year 
of the sample.24  For the guerrillas, inspection of the data shows that it was not only attacks 
against civilians suspected of paramilitary or military links that caused the increased number 
of casualties, but also attacks against villages that were trying to maintain neutrality during 
the conflict in order to instil fear and create “allegiance”.  The increased guerrilla killing of 
civilians is also related to their use of landmines and gas-canister projectiles, weapons that are 
extremely inaccurate and unstable, especially since the guerrillas build these weapons 
themselves without special expertise. 
<Insert figure 8 approximately here> 
The pattern of civilian casualties generated during government attacks is more 
complex.  It decreases and remains very low, except for 1991-92, until 1998 when the 
government weakly followed the general trend of more civilian casualties, but then the pattern 
reverses in 2000.25  This timing is relevant because late 1998 marks the beginning of “Plan 
                                                 
24 At the end of 2002 paramilitary forces declared a unilateral truce and entered into negotiations with the new 
government of President Alvaro Uribe, leading to a reduction in the intensity of their operations toward the end 
of that year. 
25 The majority of cases correspond to civilian victims of military or police operations in which there were also 
dead or injured members of armed groups or to bombardments over areas in which there were previous conflict 
events.  In 2002 antisubversive urban operations increased the number of civilian victims of government actions.  
Several large massacres occurred during 2000-2001 by paramilitary groups with which officials of the 
Colombian military were accused of collusion.  Our data set shows those events both in the series of the 
paramilitaries and that of the government, and hence we can safely say that we are not underestimating the 
number of civilians killed out of clashes during government operations.  Those cases that were included 
correspond to cases in which Colombian courts (both military and criminal ones) have indicted army officers for 
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Colombia”, the American aid program that made Colombia the third largest recipient in the 
world of American aid.  Plan Colombia contains elaborate human rights conditions.  Even 
though these can and have been waived by American presidents, the Colombian government 
unquestionably feels pressure for good human rights performance.  Figure 6 suggests that this 
pressure might be working and figure 8 supports this view as well (and footnote 25).  When 
one considers that during Plan Colombia the government substantially increased the number 
of casualties it inflicted on the guerrillas, Plan Colombia starts to look very successful.26  
However, to the extent that the growth in guerrilla and paramilitary atrocities can somehow be 
tied to Plan Colombia, this aid program appears less positive.  In fact, Restrepo and Spagat 
(2003) and Mandler and Spagat (2003) have both, in different ways argued for such linkages. 
 
4.4 The dynamics of the Guerrilla groups 
The FARC causes most guerrilla actions (figure 9).  However, before 1995 the ELN was as 
active as the FARC.  There was an impressive degree of co-ordination of joint actions at that 
time.  There was even a designation for those strictly joint operations that were carried out by 
both groups until 1993: the CGSB.27  Starting in 1996 this co-ordination almost disappeared 
as the FARC consolidated its tremendous expansion that began in 1995.  The ELN hardly 
grew during this period, although it did briefly increase its activity in 2000 when peace talks 
collapsed.  Still the ELN is far from being a spent force.  Most of the other groups correspond 
                                                                                                                                                        
failing to prevent the massacres despite having the means to do so.  Still, in most cases there has been no 
definitive verdict from the courts. 
26 At the beginning Plan Colombia was restricted to anti-drug activities but considering the involvement of the 
combatant groups in the narcotics trade the distinction between anti-drug and anti-insurgent activity is blurred.  
Moreover, the scope of activity allowed under Plan Colombia has steadily broadened. 
27 The Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB), launched in 1991, was an effort of several guerrilla 
groups, including the FARC and the ELN, to operate jointly against government forces.  In August 2003 the 
FARC and ELN recommitted themselves to co-ordinate their forces against the government and paramilitary 
groups. 
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either to guerrilla actions that are not attributable to any one group or to minor guerrilla 
groups, some of which have disappeared after peace processes. 
<Insert figure 9 approximately here> 
4.5 Paramilitarisation of the war28 
One of the most common phenomena in civil wars is that they spawn paramilitary activities.  
There is a need for local long-term security operations and interested parties tend to organise 
paramilitary corps to provide this security.  Not all civil conflicts generate paramilitaries, but 
most do.  There are different degrees of control or collusion between government forces and 
paramilitaries, depending on factors such as the degree of institutional failure in the society, 
the type of political system and the willingness of the society and foreign patrons to tolerate 
atrocities (Mandler and Spagat, 2003). 
 In Colombia paramilitarisation of the war started around 1997 (Chernick, 1998 and 
2001).  The degree of separation is large: paramilitary forces are completely independent of 
government forces, both in operational and institutional terms.  Nevertheless, there 
undoubtedly are and have been links between the Colombian military and the paramilitaries.  
These links do not reflect the policies of the governments and do not dictate the overall 
strategy of either group.  Attempts by the government to integrate and control recently created 
paramilitary groups were aborted in 1995 and today this possibility is anathema to public 
opinion, which shows little tolerance for atrocities.  In fact, after public outrage at several 
large massacres of civilians in guerrilla dominated areas by the paramilitaries around 2000, 
the latter group publicly committed itself not to massacre or kill large numbers of individuals 
and to increase their “selectiveness”.  The degree of institutional development is precarious in 
many regions of Colombia in which there is violent conflict and the extent of government 
military operations is constrained by a lack of material resources and difficulties of 
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geography.  Inspection of the data suggests that paramilitary activities tend to be located in 
zones of concentrated land tenure, previous guerrilla activities and presence of coca crops, 
although we have not yet attempted to demonstrate this statistically.   
Even more interesting is how the paramilitaries seem to fill a gap in antisubversive 
operations involving a large number of atrocities, i.e., they fight with a dirtier technology than 
does the government.  Thus, under Plan Colombia government forces have been able to 
improve their human rights performance while the anti-insurgent side of the war as a whole 
(government forces plus paramilitaries) has still been able to maintain inherently dirty anti-
infrastructure activities.  The US has used Plan Colombia to apply pressure on the Colombian 
military to improve its human rights performance, a goal that finds much support in the 
Colombian population itself.  At the same time Plan Colombia provides technology, such as 
night and thermal vision equipment and training programmes for government troops and 
military judges intended to help improve the cleanliness of government operations.  Recall 
that figures 6 and 8 indicate definite improvement in these areas.  However, a possible dark 
side of this success is that it might have actually encouraged the paramilitaries to step into a 
void and increase their dirty activities. 
 
4.6 Illegal rents and internal conflict  
The connection between the financial viability of warring parties and the existence of a 
conflict has been stressed at least since the seminal work of Haavelmo (1954) on predation.  
Recently, the World Bank has concentrated on showing the importance of viability factors in 
determining the course of modern civil wars (World Bank, 2003).  In cross-country studies 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998 and 2001) have found a link between predation of natural resource 
rents and civil conflicts, although these effects are not large.   
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Chernick (2001) provides this felicitous phrase. 
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Here we simply provide a graphical illustration for Colombia using the value of 
narcotraffic revenues as calculated by Rocha (2001) and the activity and intensity measures 
from our data set (figure 10).29  We find a very high correlation between the value of narcotics 
revenues and conflict activities, giving credence to the notion that finances are driving the 
conflict.  Nevertheless, this link falters beginning in 1997 when the war heats up just as drug 
revenue is decreasing.  This is about two years after the Colombian government really began 
to fight an anti-drug war seriously, scoring a big success by breaking up the large cartels.  
This result took the larger rents associated with the transport and distribution stages of the 
business out of the hands of Colombian-based organisations, weakening these structures, and 
creating an opportunity for armed organisations to prey on a larger scale off the small parts of 
the drug business close to production that were left behind.  So plausibly the dismantling of 
the large narcotics cartels provided an opening for both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries to 
increase their appropriations, especially at the first stages in the chain of production.30  Thus, 
victory over the cartels might actually have fuelled the conflict.31  Neither the paramilitaries 
nor the guerrillas have the necessary skills to rebuild full cartel structures and in the few cases 
when they have tried to do so enforcement efforts have been successful.  However, the above 
discussion suggests that progress against narcotraffic should not automatically be equated 
with progress against the guerrillas. 
<Insert figure 10 approximately here> 
As noted above drug money is just one income source for the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries, kidnapping being an important second source.  In fact, Colombia has the 
                                                 
29 The Rocha (2001) figures are not the potential retail value of the crops.  Rather, they are the potential 
wholesale value of the estimated production. 
30 Even when the drug cartels were strong the guerrillas profited from the early initial stages of the production of 
cocaine and opium, namely the cultivation of coca and poppy plants and the production of the coca paste and 
opium resin.  Both activities tend to occur in areas under control of an armed actor or contested by several such 
actors and these groups have long taken a cut or a “tax” of the value of production.   
31 Another possible complementary mechanism for this phenomenon is that peasants whose crops have been 
destroyed in an eradication operation might see joining an armed groups as their best survival option. 
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highest kidnapping rate in the world.  Figure 10 shows a rapid rise in kidnappings between 
1996 and 2000 during the upsurge in the conflict.32  This suggests another possible 
unintended consequence of the drug war in the form of a substitution of kidnapping revenues 
to replace drug money.  Moreover, this substitution effect might also apply to other revenue 
sources such as extortion, predation of local government budgets and rents derived from land 
expropriation and protection rackets, on which reliable information is not available.   
 
5 Conclusions 
We have only just begun to analyse our data set.  Yet it is already yielding interesting 
information and hypotheses.  We are intrigued by the suggested links between developments 
in the drug business and the conduct of the civil conflict, including the possibility of some 
unintended consequences of the drug war.  We are also interested in the effects of Plan 
Colombia, particularly the improved human rights performance of the government in the 
midst of a general and severe deterioration of the overall human rights environment.  In 
theoretical work, Restrepo and Spagat (2003) and Mandler and Spagat (2003) have focused 
on this phenomenon and in the future we will be using our data to study these models further.  
We are also interested in the complex relationship between criminal activities and conflict 
actions and in the dynamic analysis of the high-frequency data. 
 There remains much more potential in the data.  For example, so far we have barely 
exploited its geographical dimensions.  We expect this aspect will allow us to analyse a 
variety of questions such as possible co-ordination between the paramilitaries and government 
forces, links between the conflict and the narcotics trade, and possible connections between 
economic inequality and conflict where both vary by region.  Eventually, we should be able to 
                                                 
32 The kidnapping series was provided by the National Police (Policía Nacional, Revista Criminalidad) 
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provide a rich empirical description of the Colombian conflict and hopefully some new ideas 
on how it might be resolved. 
 Finally, we are convinced that the methodology for collecting civil conflict data that 
we apply to the Colombian case can be used and improved in order to build data bases for 
other civil conflicts. We hope soon to embark on the building of databases for at least another 
country. This will allow us to contrast the findings of the Colombian case and further test our 
findings. 
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Figure 1.  Attacks, clashes, conflict intensity and the homicide rate 
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Figure 2.  Intensity as killed and injured 
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Figure 3.  Attacks by group 
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Figure 4.  Clashes by group 
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Figure 5.  Guerrilla-related casualties 
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Figure 6.  Government-related casualties 
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Figure 7.  Paramilitary-related casualties 
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Figure 8.  Civilian victimisation by group, out of clashes 
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Figure 9.  Guerrilla events by group 
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Figure 10.  Events, intensity, kidnappings and value of narcotics production 
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